The knowledge people have of the degree of fire threat is considered to be important to an understanding of the time people need for response.
INTRODUCTION
Fire tragedies involving a large number of fatalities usually have one simple feature in common. A serious delay occurred in the occupants of the bui l di ng becoming or bei ng made aware of the encroachi ng danger. In the Summerland Fire, Isle of Man, U.K. 1973 (in which 50 people died) and the Beverly Hills Supper Club Fire, U.S. A. 1977 (in which 164 died), there was some 20 minutes from the time of the initial discovery of the fire by a staff member to the point when most people became fully aware of a direct danger to their lives. What had been sufficient time available for egress turned into a situation in which the time needed for everyone to leave was too great to guarantee thei r safety. In this respect the concepts of time 'needed' (or 'required') and time avai l abl e for egress, juxtaposed in safety planning and design formulae, could be usefully complemented by attention to the time available as perceived by people in fires. This concept of perceived time available (PTA) is a central focus of this paper and helps in understanding patterns of movement preceding any attempt to escape.
The aim of the paper is to shift the focus away from measures of time needed which concentrate almost exclusively on egress.
For important time can be lost in the period preceding egress. Thinking of the perceived time available (PTA) highlights the incomplete knowledge about the fire threat people in different parts of a building are likely to have at different stages. PTA refers to the time an individual feels is available, for example, to reach an exit and knowledge of the time available to carry out the action. PTA can also refer to a person's view of the likelihood that other people will be able to carry out an action in time to avoid injury. People in fires often pursue investigative and affiliative actions (moving towards other people) in an attempt to reduce uncertainty. The amount of information about a fire influences the timing of people's escape and effectiveness of their actions. Figure 1 is a representation of the rate of fire growth in relation to the diminishing availability of escape or refuge options in a hotel fire.
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
(1) The options, termed objective and objective (perceived) 'degrees of freedom' by Breaux (1), diminished rapidly once a fire took hold. As he points out "The unfortunate aspect is that once a fi re reaches the stage of giving off noi ses, it is approaching or has reached the stage when one can expect nonlinear growth". Although we were not able to measure the durations of actions in this fire our attempts in general to carry out statistical analyses on act sequences in fires (2, 3, 4) have explored the temporal sequence of acts. In another study of the hotel fire represented in Figure 1 , I traced (mapped out) the path and distance of movement on the architectural plan of the building (3). The sources of data were interview transcripts from the 33 fire survivors. The fire was chararacterised not only by guests in the hotel not being aware of the fi re spreading up the central stai rcase until it was too late to leave by a 'normal route', but the misinterpretation of early cues to the fire's existence.
Movement by the hotel occupants generally involved individuals opening their hotel room door to investigate noises, only to find the fire had already cut off the main stairway route to safety. The fire began sometime before 2.00 am. It is estimated by the fire brigade, who arrived at 2.11 am, that within six minutes of the fire being first discovered by one of the residents it had involved the central stairway enclosure.
The 'time lag' between the objective growth of a fire and people's knowledge of this and available escape routes from different parts of a building is characteri st i c of many seri ous fi res. In fi res we studi ed rangi ng from domestic fires in buildings of one or two storeys, to large-scale multipleoccupancy fi res, the early stage of recognition was often characteri sed by ambiguous information cues. In a number of cases there was a serious delay in people taking these cues seriously before they realised there was a fire. Unknown to the occupants the fire was already reducing the time available to reach safety.
A further analysis (2) showed that the likelihood of reaching safety without assistance in the hotel fire example depended on accurately interpreting the early ambiguous cues. Breaux describes the 'false hope juncture' along the abscissa of Figure 1 as, "a situation for several individuals in which the ability to evade the fire was so curtailed that they were considering jumping from a fourth floor window". In this case, the respondents subjective degrees of freedom (i .e. alternatives considered viable) appear to have changed to admit an option previously not entertained. (5, 6). Both events share a similar time scale. Point A represents the 'design potential' for the Engl ish structure and those rooms in the American nightclub. As Breaux points out "ironically, by mere virtue that people are using the buildings there is already a reduction in possible escape routes. This is due to such measures as locking doors to keep out pilferers, gatecrashers and others for whom entry is unauthorised. This in itself is interesting for it means that certain structures are already affected before the fi re".
In both cases the fi re begins somewhat after B in Figure 2 . As Breaux points out "In total, the curve which describes progressive route reduction is of a history or sigmoid type. Of primary interest concerning the fire is that section defined by the function Y = ax b which extends from 'B' onwards.
The meaning of this environmental relationship is, simply, ways to escape disappear at an ever faster rate". (data pre-fire
The behaviour of people, the escape route capacity, the fire growth are interrelated. This is best illustrated by the fact that the main reason for a rapid change in the escape possibilities of people is often the point when a person investigating a source of ambiguous information opens a door to the room of fire origin. Either the person forgets to close the door or is often unable to as the fire, which has been developing for some time in an enclosed space, rapidly escapes into the building from where the person has come. Time needed expands or reduces by vi rtue of a person's knowledge of the threat (i .e. perceived time available: PTA).
STAGES IN REQUIRED SAFE EGRESS TIME
The terms 'time needed' and 'time available' derive directly from recent attempts to 'model' what is going on in fires. A number of people have elaborated an equation for estimating life safety, in which the basic principle adhered to is that the time it takes for an individual or building population to reach safety, should not exceed the time it takes for fire conditions to make it possible to reach safety. The simplest form of this time needed versus time available equation (7) Cooper (10) has been working on the 'time available' aspects of a model of fire growth. The aim has been to develop a quantitative criterion for safe building design, which he terms the 'designed safety egress criterion', viz: relative to a potentially hazardous fire, a building is of safe design if ASET = Thaz -Tdet > RSET (4) Equation (d) This principle expressed in the same terms as equations (1) to (3) gives:
RSET ASET Cooper concentrates on possible ways in which to estimate ASET. He writes "Assuming a capability for estimating RSET, the results of this study, through application of the designed safety egress criterion, would lead to rational evaluations of building safety." Where there is an immediate problem in this model is that it refers to egress movement following an 'alarm'.
To take account of the pattern of psychological and social responses in a variety of fires, any principle of safety design has to accommodate rather than discount the time it takes to respond to an 'alarm' or 'cue'. Unless there is a highly efficient communication system (public announcement system) people in different parts of a building are not, or cannot by definition be, simultaneously aware of the degree of a threat. The ASET model is currently addressed primarily to the issue of egress systems and forms of fi re resistance designed into the building. Yet what is crucial is not only the time it takes to move to safety but when this movement begins.
A REVISED RSET EQUATION
The following equation, which concentrates on RSET, is intended to accommodate both the percei ved time component and the pattern of movement pri or to and during movement to safety. It is belng used as the basic framework by a research team consisting of In terms of the Australian research on high-rise office buildings, the primary distinction will be between movement which takes place on the upper fl oor of a but 1di ng and that on a protected stai rway. These phases are termed: The task will be to try to establish broad time estimates for these movement phases.
In equation (e) RSET includes a recognition phase (Tr), and ASET a detection phase (Tdet).
McCl ennan (11) uses the term 'Exit Access' to refer both to the psychological/social factors involved in people moving towards an exit from a space and the physical design of access to an area of 'relative' or 'complete' safety. The aim here is to develop a design model which integrates research on psychological/social responses and the timing of physical movement to and through exits.
MEASURING THE TIME IT TAKES TO RESPOND IN FIRES
A recent overview of egress research in relation to the N.F.P.A.'s 1976 Life Safety Code (9) reflects limited knowledge of the time people expend in the early stages of a fire. Research on building evacuations (12) has been able to use 'time' directly as a measure of movement. Yet the time to act in the Tr and Tc stages has been ignored or inferred to date due to the problems in (a) measuring time directly in fires (b) reliability of time estimates given by fire survivors.
In one questionnaire survey (13) people were asked to estimate the time it took for them 'in leaving' buildings on fire. The average estimate of time to leave of 1.92 minutes was inevitably nearer to 'perceived' than actual time. Moreover the question of what constitutes 'leaving' is open to different interpretations since in low-rise domestic fires (a high percentage of the sample) leaving a house can take place in the Tr, Tc or Te stages and can be followed by re-entry more than once. The few time experiments which have been conducted (14)(15)(16) generally suggest it would be difficult to obtain reliable estimates from individuals of the actual distances they travel in fires. This difficulty would be reduced in research of behaviour in fires if the 'estimates' were compared with objective physical measures of the distances along routes through the building which people indicated they followed.
Experiments on potential entrapment simulate the scramble for an exit assumed to occur when people are faced by the diminishing possibil ity of everyone reaching safety in a fire (17) but bear little similarity to the time it takes to reach an exit in a fire. This experimental research of RSET/ASET ignores the ambiguity of fires and delays in warning which make such behaviour so unavoidable (18) .
It may well be that the greatest potential for incorporating valid time estimates into an RSET/ASET model is in the area of simulation research in which time can be measured directly. Some research has measured the time it takes to evacuate a ward (19) and to enact different sequences of actions (20) in fire role playing exercises. Recording times for the early phases of monitored evacuations (21) wi 11 yield useful information. If the behaviour is also found to occur in researched fires, it could provide a useful estimate of the likely duration of acts which otherwise could not be recorded. The validity of role playing exercises and advice, on how to decrease needed time and increase available time in emergency planning (22) , depends very much on the adequacy of research on actual behaviour in emergencies. By 'mapping' distances moved by people in fires (using architectural plans) (3) it may be possible to assign estimated travel times to these distances, based on knowledge of the fi res and knowledge of characteristic speeds of 'pedestrian movement'. Video disc simulations of escape routes, as potentially viewed by escapees in fires, could also incorporate a time component (23) .
IMPROVING THE MARGIN OF SAFETY
What one wants to move away from is the tenous basis for time estimates enshrined in design yardsticks. For example, an assumption in the British codes is that a fire compartment should be evacuated in 2! minutes if people's safety is to be assured (24) . The recent fire tragedy at Bradford City Football Club (May 1985) highlights the problems in concentrating on the 2t minutes escape criterion without taking into account the time to begin movement (25) . This period of time may exceed 2! minutes and suggests the importance of a prompt warning to evacuate being put over a public announcement system.
The reason for emphasizing PTA, as an essential component of a RSET/ASET model, was my concern to point out the danger in considering that a direct mathematical or predictive relationship can be found between time needed and time available, independantly of the knowledge building users have at different stages about the fire's growth. Essentially, the current problem in comparing RSET and ASET lies in the assumption that, once an automatic smoke detector or alarm is set out off, the occupants of a building recognise there is a fi re and wi 11 start thei r escape immediately. This is rather like equating people with inanimate objects or 'snooker balls', which upon external impact from an outside physical force (the 'cue'), will be propelled towards a an exit (the 'pocket') (26) . This physical-science model of people's movement assumes that Tdet = Tr. In contrast, there is likely to be a time lag between Tdet and Tr; thus Tdet f Tr , The potential mismatch between Tdet and Tr, the time it takes people to interpret and respond to initial changes in the social and physical environment of a fire, has to be reduced. The margin of safety, referred to in the title of this paper, is the time lag between the 'objective' and 'subjective' degrees of freedom (i .e , the actual and perceived: state of the fire and availability of exits).
In conclusion, time required is an 'elastic' psychological concept in the sense that for the people in a fire it expands or shrinks according to perceived time available (PTA). The characterisation of time required as a subjective concept, as well as an objective one (referring to the time it takes to move around and escape from a building), is not one with which those working on the physical fire growth and design parameters of the ASET model are likely to feel comfortable.
It is, however, a more accurate reflection of the limits of knowledge of a fire threat, which explain much of people's behaviour and timing of escape in fires. The key to improving the margin of safety undoubtedly lies as much in efficient forms of information and communication about the state of the fire at different stages, as in the building's design. Time available to escape can be increased by helping people to respond promptly in the Tp (perception) phase and use the time economically in the Tc (coping) phase of response. Paradoxically, one has to try to reduce rather than increase the perceived time available, if one wants to prompt people to begin their escape 1n t1me to reach safety.
